

## I. NOTICE OF CHANGES IN FULL CLASSIFICATION, NAME, OR FULL NUMBER:

FROM

TO

EFFECTIVE DATE

## II. NOTICE OF FIRST COMMISSION, DECOMMISSION OR RECOMMISSION:

FIRST COMMISSION DATE:

DECOMMISSIONED DATE:

DATE RECOMMISSIONED:

## III. NOTICE OF TRANSFER, LOAN, NAME STRIKE AND FINAL DISPOSAL:

## A. Name of Country, State or other to whom loan is scheduled:

Scheduled date of loan:

Actual date of loan:

Authority:



Military Assistance Specify in other:

Name assigned by Foreign Nation:

## B. Date Name Stricken from the Navy List:

## C. Date of transfer and Identification of Agency to whom transferred:

For Disposal:

(Date)

(Agency)

## D. RECORD OF FINAL DISPOSAL:

Sold For:



Scrapping



Maritime Commercial use



Private ownership by individual

Identification and Address of Purchaser: E. Erhardt y Cia.Ltda., c/o Jacq. Pierot Jr. & Sons, 27 William St., New York 5,  
New YorkDate of Sale: 31 March 1960Purchase Price: \$218,888.89

## IV. Other:

0055  
File No.  
CVE 75/  
Serial

U.S.S. HOGGATT BAY (CVE 75)

OCT 11 1944

**DECLASSIFIED**

**From:** Commander Task Group 30.7 (Commanding Officer, U.S.S. HOGGATT BAY).  
**To :** Commander in Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet.  
**Via :** (1) Commander THIRD Fleet.  
 (2) Commander Air Force, U. S. Pacific Fleet.  
**Subject:** Anti-submarine Warfare Operations During Period 1 September - 9 October 1944 - narrative of.

1. In compliance with general directives, the following narrative of Anti-submarine Warfare operations conducted by Task Group 30.7 during the period 1 September - 9 October 1944, is submitted.

2. (a) On 1 September Task Group 30.7 consisting of HOGGATT BAY (CVE 75), SHIELD (DD 5), BRIS (DD 10), SAMPSON S. MILES (DD 183), and SHIP (DD 296), got underway from Henderson Bay, Manus Island, in accordance with Commander Western Pacific Task Forces' Operation Plan 14.14 to rendezvous with Task Force 38 at latitude 00° 0' North, Longitude 150° 00' East.
- (b) At 2252 on 1 September, PAUL HAMILTON (DD 590), attached to Task Group 30.7, reported a sound contact at latitude 00° 11' South, Longitude 148° 50' East. SHIP and MILES were sent to relieve PAUL HAMILTON and develop the contact. A hedging attack on what appeared to be a good sound contact was initiated by MILES at 0226, 2 September with negative results. Shortly after daylight, two large submerged trees were sighted in the area, and it was decided that these were the cause of the contact. SHIP and MILES steamed to rejoin after remaining at the scene for 1 1/2 hours.
- (c) Rendezvous with Task Force 38 was effected at 0420 on 2 September, and Task Group 30.7 was assigned station to the westward, distance 10 miles, while fueling operations were in progress. Four-plane Anti-submarine Patrol and four-plane Combat Air Patrol were flown from dawn-to-dusk in the Northwest and Southwest quadrants.
- (d) On 3 September, three of Task Group 30.7's escorts were topped-off from units of Task Group 30.8.
- (e) At 1800, 4 September, Task Force 38 took up a westerly

CINCPAC/BOX #4910 RS #3176 FILE A16-3/SECRET #1-1-44

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course with Task Group 30.7 ahead of the disposition, distance 50 miles. Routine Anti-submarine Patrol and Combat Air Patrol were flown during daylight hours, and three two-plane night search teams were launched on 5th, 6th, and 7th September.

- (f) On 5 September, upon completion of refueling of Task Force 38's escorts, Task Group 30.7 was detached from Task Force 38 and proceeded to latitude 00° 30' South, Longitude 145° 25' East, where it rendezvoused with Task Group 32.19, and reported for duty to Commander Task Unit 32.7.2 at 0910 on 9 September. Task Group 30.7 took station as a forward anti-submarine screen on the track of approach of Task Force 32. In addition to the regular daylight Anti-submarine Patrols and Combat Air Patrols, night Anti-submarine Patrol planes were flown on 9 and 11 September.
- (g) At 1800 on 9 September, HEDD took over a sound contact made by HAZELWOOD of Task Group 32.19's screen. HAZELWOOD had lost the contact by the time HEDD reached the scene and it was never regained. Task Group 30.7 boxed the area until 2350 with negative results.
- (h) On 12 September, Task Group 30.7 fueled from units of Task Unit 30.8.8.
- (i) On 14 September, Task Group 30.7 was detached from Task Unit 32.7.2 and directed to operate in the Northwest quadrant from Palolia to a distance of 100 miles. Continual daylight air coverage of the area bounded by latitude 6° - 9° North and Longitude 131° - 133° East was maintained throughout the period 15 - 25 September with negative results.
- (j) At 2315, 19 September, HOGGATT BAY intercepted a message from MENDONIA (ASST 73) in amplification of a previous message relayed from her to Task Group 30.7 by Commander Task Force 32, stating that she was being trailed at a distance of 1 mile by a submarine which she had sighted visually and had radar contact with. The course of Task Group 30.7 was changed to intercept, but due to the fact communication could not be made with MENDONIA either on the Local Warning Net or via TBS, it was not until 0152 that Task Group

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30.7 closed HERRMINE and commenced a search of the area. No report was received from HERRMINE when she was intercepted. No radar or sound contact was made at any time by Task Group 30.7, and it is believed that the HERRMINE's radar had picked up her own wake.

- (k) At 1601 on 23 September, while the task group was fueling to the Northeast of Kessel Passage, STERN made a sound contact in Latitude  $7^{\circ} 55'$  North, Longitude  $134^{\circ} 32'$  East and initiated an embarrassing attack with depth charges. At 1650 SHED was sent to assist, but the contact was not regained. At 1845 the remainder of the Task Group commenced a square search, which was broken off without result after 18 hours.
- (l) At 0700 on 25 September, this group rendezvoused with Task Group 30.8 and received 2 VF and 2 VP replacement aircraft, 3 VF pilots, 1 VP pilot, and 6 combat aircrewmembers.
- (m) At 0400, 26 September, Task Group 30.7 was detached from Task Unit 32.7.2 and departed Point Petrel for Anti-submarine Warfare operations to the North and West of Saipan in accordance with Commander THIRD Fleet's despatch 220230 of September.
- (n) Task Group 30.7 arrived on station 26 September and conducted intensive Anti-submarine Warfare operations in assigned area until 30 September, at which time it departed for Palau in accordance with Commander THIRD Fleet's despatch 290448 of September.
- (o) On arrival Palau area on 2 October, Task Group 30.7 reported to Commander Task Force 32 and was directed to investigate a submarine contact at Latitude  $7^{\circ} 44'$  North, Longitude  $133^{\circ} 36'$  East which had been reported by a patrol plane during the night of 1 October. At 2030 the task group commenced a square search around the contact point. At 0311, 3 October a shark was picked up by the HOGGATT BAY's 36 radar in Latitude  $7^{\circ} 48'$  North, Longitude  $133^{\circ} 25'$  East, bearing  $268^{\circ}(T)$ , distance 20,000 yards; indicated course  $190^{\circ}(T)$ , speed 4 knots. Shortly thereafter, course

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of contact changed to 240°(T). At 0130 NILES was sent to investigate, and picked up the target on radar at about 14,000 yards. At 0146 target was lost when NILES was 3,000 yards distant. At 0151 STEELE was dispatched to assist NILES. At 0359 NILES made sound contact at a distance of 1500 yards and made a hedging attack at 0408 with negative results. At 0418 a second hedging attack was made by NILES and two hits were scored at a depth of 150 feet. 25 seconds later, there were 3 violent underwater explosions which put out of commission the NILES' sound gear, FDS, and SO radar. In addition, her ANK antenna was knocked loose from the signal yardarm. These explosions were distinctly felt by HURON, SHED, and HOGGATT BAY at a distance of 10 miles. The engine room crew of the latter described the explosions as producing a sustained rumbling sound which grew in intensity and lasted for approximately 20 seconds. NILES and STEELE remained at the scene until 1600 and were assisted by TBN's in their search for the oil slick. Both the attack phase and the subsequent search phase were conducted in heavy seas in a 30 knot wind. No wreckage was observed. At about 1330, the BN's assisted by search planes located an oil slick which was beginning to form. This was not believed to be an unduly long time, as the water here was 2000 fathoms. The underwater explosion far exceeded in intensity similar explosions experienced in five previous kills. For this reason, and due to the fact that floating mines were discovered in the vicinity, it is believed this was a mine laying submarine. It is further believed that the above attack resulted in a definite kill.

- (p) At 1502, 3 October, Task Group 30.7 departed area in accordance with Commander Task Force 32's despatch 030612 of October which directed the task group to investigate a possible submarine contact at latitude 8° 19' North, Longitude 135° 22' East after first fueling the BN's at Kessel Passage. This contact was originally reported by GAPERSON (DD 690) on October 2.
- (q) At 2200, 4 October, Task Group 30.7 arrived at scene of GAPERSON contact and began a square search of the area.

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(x) At 0830, 5 October, approximately 53 hours after the successful hedging attack made by MILMS on 3 October, two search planes were returned to the point of sinking and relocated the oil slick in a rough sea. Heavy seas and high wind conditions had continued unabated during the intervening period. However, the slick was still of a very definite character and diesel oil was still bubbling to the surface.

(a) At 2200, 5 October, Task Group 30.7 left the scene of the CAPERSON contact after searching the area for 24 hours without result and headed for Point Coal where departure was taken for Manus in accordance with Commander THIRD Fleet's despatch 020556 of October.

(b) At 1400, 9 October, Task Group 30.7 arrived Seadler Harbor after an uneventful trip.

3. In order to conduct an extensive search coverage of the assigned area, 16 VT search planes divided into four 4-plane teams were flown from dawn-to-dusk during the subject period except for 5 days, 7 - 11 September, when intermediate patrols were flown by VT on the second and third hops. This was done in order to reduce the excessive work load being carried by the VT pilots. With a complement of 15 VT pilots, each pilot was required to fly three and a half hours a day plus an additional three and a half hours every sixth day. On a monthly basis, this adds up to a total of 120 hours. In order to remedy this unsatisfactory situation, it is recommended that the complement of planes, pilots and combat aircrewmembers attached to CVE's assigned to Anti-submarine Warfare be adjusted as follows:

(a) VT planes	14
(b) VT planes	12
(c) VT pilots	21
(d) VT pilots	15
(e) Combat aircrewmembers	42

In order to fly 16 search sorties during daylight hours and provide for two

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night search pilots as well as allow for possible losses and pilots on the bimbo list, fifty percent spare VT pilots is considered an absolute minimum. Since the number of VT planes assigned to combat air patrol is normally reduced to two when the possibility of enemy A/C interception is remote, the hours logged by VT pilots is approximately half that logged by the VT pilots. The recommended reduction in both VT plane and pilot complement in favor of increased VT planes and pilots would provide a maximum availability commensurate with the plane and pilot requirements for Anti-submarine Warfare operations. On 23 September, this ship took on from STRAKER BAY additional VT pilots and aircrews to provide for 50% spares for the number of VT planes now assigned.

4. The biggest problem encountered during subject period was that of maintenance. The spare parts allotted to carriers of this type are not sufficient to maintain the planes over extended operating periods. This is particularly true of VT slip ring housings, gyro instruments, TBM tail wheel and landing gear cylinders, TBM unloader valves, and generator gear box and drive assemblies. It is felt that the allowance of spares should be increased in the case of CVE's assigned to Anti-submarine Warfare operations in order to insure the successful completion of their assignment. Plane availability would have been reduced 2 VT and 1 VT during the latter half of the period if spares had not been removed from 3 permanent units which were stripped and fettised.

5. TBM's had to be launched and landed with their bomb loads of 1400 pounds under highly unfavorable wind conditions - 17 to 22 knots across the deck - during most of the period. This meant that all catapult shots had to be made at maximum pressures. Needless to say, the wear and tear on the catapult machinery is excessive and the normal life expectancy materially reduced under such conditions. The arresting gear is likewise subjected to excessive loads due to the relatively high speeds at which the overloaded VT's (16,500 lbs.) must be landed.

6. The night searches, mentioned in paragraphs 2(d) and 2(e), were launched four hours prior to sunrise. Searches were conducted on moonlight nights when the visibility was good and the horizon was easily discernable. Aircraft Search Plan #1 - Parallel Sweeps, as described in FTR 223, was used with the planes flying to a distance of 50 miles to right and left of the base course. Instrument conditions were encountered on several occasions in the areas searched. Since this type of search is primarily dependant on radar, it



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is vitally important that combat aircrews be thoroughly trained in all phases of radar operation. Of the 16 air combat radiomen assigned VC-14 based aboard the HOGGATT BAY, only 12 have been to radar school for the prescribed two weeks course. AN-7 radar equipment is installed in the ENL-10's on board, and the OVE could be picked up at approximately 25 miles at an altitude of 1500 feet. It is estimated that a submarine could be picked up between 10 and 15 miles depending upon target angle and amount of surface area above water. During optimum visibility conditions, the OVE and EN's could be sighted visually at a distance of 5 miles 90° from the moon quadrant. Recovery of night search planes was made thirty minutes before sunrise. All five night searches were flown with negative results.

7. The average night flying time logged by the attached VT pilots is less than thirty hours. No special night training was given them during their indoctrination period and none had had any night instrument work. It is recommended that specially trained night search pilots and combat aircrews be assigned to OVE's on Anti-submarine Warfare assignments, for the possibilities of locating enemy submarines are greatly enhanced during periods of darkness.

8. It is further recommended that patrol squadrons, flying night searches in an area being patrolled by a Japanese Task Group, be directed to work in close liaison and initiate intensive night patrols within the effective range of the group.

9. It is strongly recommended that MAD and Sona Buys be made available to OVE-base aircraft engaged in Japanese operations in order that Anti-submarine Warfare in the Western Pacific may be prosecuted with greater success in the future.

10. It is felt that more stress should be laid on night Anti-submarine flights on future operations, for in the past five months, during which time HOGGATT BAY has been engaged in Anti-submarine Warfare operations, her search planes have never so much as sighted a submarine, although the swirl of one which was subsequently destroyed was located by one of the Combat Air Patrol. During the period of this report, VC-14 planes flew 893 Anti-submarine Patrol - Combat Air Patrol sorties for a total of 2957 hours. 511 search and Anti-submarine Patrol sorties were flown for a total of 1652 hours. Since departing Majuro on 22 May, the HOGGATT BAY has operated at sea 116 days out of 141. Total Anti-submarine Patrol - Combat Air Patrol sorties for that period was 2389 for a total of 7680 hours.



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OCT 11 1944

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Subject: Anti-submarine Warfare Operations During Period 1 September -  
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11. All times are ISTH.

W. V. RAINBOWS.

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FILE

A16-3/(11)

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET  
THIRD FLEET

Serial 00128

~~SECRET~~

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DEC 8 1944

1ST ENFORCEMENT on  
CTG 30.7 (CO, U.S.S.  
HOGGATT BAY) Secret  
ltr. OVM75/A16-3,  
Serial 0055, dated  
11 October, 1944.

From: The Commander THIRD Fleet.  
To : The Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet.  
Via : The Commander Air Force, U.S. Pacific Fleet.

Subject: Anti-Submarine Warfare Operations During Period 1 September -  
9 October, 1944 - narrative of.

1. Forwarded. The efficiency and dependability of Task Group 30.7 during the subject period has been outstanding.

2. The Commander Air Force, U. S. Pacific Fleet, is requested to comment on the recommendations contained in paragraphs 3 and 4.

3. The maintaining of planes over a contact, both day and night, is an essential of JASABA operations if kills are to be obtained. Approval and implementing of the recommendations in paragraph 7 are imperative.

4. It is believed the increase of complement of VT, to include the necessary VT(N) pilots, is highly desirable on the OVEs assigned to ASW.

5. The recommendations in paragraphs 9 and 10 are concurred in.

*W. F. Halsey.*

Copy to:  
CTG 30.7

AL6-3/FF12-5/  
(112-ofr)  
Serial

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET  
AIR FORCE, PACIFIC FLEET

00203

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30 JAN 1945

~~SECRET~~  
2nd Endorsement to:  
CG, USS HOGGATT BAY  
Secret Ltr., CVE75/  
AL6-3, Serial 0055,  
dated 11 October  
1944.

From: Commander Air Force, Pacific Fleet.  
To : Commander in Chief, United States Pacific Fleet.  
Subject: ASW Operations During Period 1 September to  
9 October 1944 - Narrative of.  
Reference: (a) SinSPac Conf. Decp. 261042 of November.

1. Forwarded, concurring in the first endorsement, subject to the following comments:

(a) At the time the HOGGATT BAY was designated for ASW duty, no special ASW equipment nor training facilities were available in this area. In spite of this handicap, however, the HOGGATT BAY has been used effectively. More recently, the ANZIO (CVE57), CORNBIDGE (CVE98), TULAGI (CVE72), MCKIN ISLAND (CVE93), LUNGA POINT (CVE94), BISMARCK SEA (CVE95), and SALAMAU (CVE96) have been equipped and trained for ASW work, but all of these CVEs are not being utilized for that purpose. Reference (a) authorized removal of all Mono Bay equipped aircraft in excess of two squadrons from the latter four ships. Since it is not practicable to so equip and train all CVEs without seriously compromising their efficiency for other missions, selective assignment of CVEs to ASW duty appears necessary.

(b) The necessary aircraft for an increase of the VT complement on ASW carriers are available. The present program calls for assignment of 50% spare pilots, subject to pilot availability. Maximum night flying training possible in radar equipped aircraft will be afforded VT pilots of those VC squadrons designated for ASW. Optimum provision for trained personnel would ensue if VT(N) pilots were assigned to ASW VC squadrons. However, present pilot training quotas will not provide a sufficient number for this purpose until late 1945.

(c) Aircraft spare parts allowances for all operating carriers must be similar in range and quantity of items, and official Buair

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A16-3/FF12-5/  
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UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET  
AIR FORCE, PACIFIC FLEET

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80 JAN 1945

Subject: ASW Operations During Period 1 September to  
9 October 1944 - Narrative of.

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allowances are prepared on this basis by the Aviation Supply Office, Philadelphia. In view of the increased flying time and night landings involved in ASW duty, it is recognized that the consumption of spare parts is greater than is the case during normal carrier operations. CVEs assigned to ASW duty are authorized to requisition in excess, quantities of such high - usage items. ComAirPac will prepare a list of items for which in excess requisitions are justified. By copy of this endorsement, the USS HOGGATT BAY (CVE75) is requested to furnish ComAirPac with detailed recommendations which may be used in the preparation of such a list.

(d) ASW squadrons are being equipped and trained with Sone Buoy equipment as rapidly as the availability of the equipment permits. Two (2) sets of MAD equipment have been requested from CNO for evaluation, since the suitability of MAD equipment for ASW work from CVEs is questionable.

(e) Night search in ASW operations will be greatly facilitated by the use of the TBM-3E. This airplane, equipped with AN/APG-4 radar will begin replacing the present ASB equipped TBM-3 series about 15 March 1945.

F. W. McMAHON,  
Chief of Staff

Copy to:  
Com3rd Flt.  
CO, USS HOGGATT BAY (CVE75).

*checked w/p  
JER 12/24*

### HISTORY OF USS HOGGATT BAY (CVE 75)

The USS HOGGATT BAY, twenty-first of the CASABLANCA Class carriers was commissioned on January 11, 1944 at the Naval Station Astoria, Oregon. The keel had been laid on August 17, 1943 and she had been launched on December 4, 1943. Following a brief commissioning ceremony, Captain J. D. Barner, U. S. Navy, Commanding Officer of the naval station, transferred command to Captain W. V. Saunders, U. S. Navy.

Throughout the month of January the ship was outfitted at the Naval Station and then proceeded to the Naval Repair Base, San Diego, California, via Illahee, Washington for ammunition and torpedoes; Bremerton, Washington for engine tests, degaussing, performance statistics, bomb loading; Alameda, California for aviation supplies and arrived at San Diego on February 22.

During the early part of March, exercises including anti-aircraft and surface gunnery, aircraft deck spotting and tactical drills were conducted under the supervision of the Commander Operational Training Command, Pacific Fleet.

The ship got underway for Pearl Harbor on March 10 transporting aircraft and personnel, and returned to San Diego. *25 March*

The latter part of March was utilized in conducting extensive aircraft operations and general training. Captain Saunders made the first take-off and landed aboard the HOGGATT BAY on March 27.

Leaving the United States on May 1 with Composite Squadron FOURTEEN (TBMs and RMs), commanded by Lieutenant Commander F. H. Tammany, USNR, and later by Lieutenant C. H. Obrist, USN, the HOGGATT BAY in command of Task Group 30.4 proceeded to an enemy submarine area 1° South to 2° North, 148° to 152° East, to conduct air, sound and surface submarine searches, augmented by Black Cat planes at night from nearby Emirau Island.

*Arr P.H. 8 May, Majuro 17 May*

The escort carrier had already proven itself in the Atlantic. In this case, in the Pacific, it proved to be perfectly suited to anti-submarine warfare. Flying thirty to forty flights a day, often two torpedo planes flying from 0200 until dawn, the aircraft were able to keep the submarines submerged a large part of the time and the destroyers and destroyer escorts gave them no rest underwater.

*26 May  
190 June*

Already versed in anti-submarine warfare, VC FOURTEEN conducted extensive indoctrination aboard the HOGGATT BAY en route to the operating area and were in condition for the strenuous assignment. Torpedo plane pilots flew at least one four-hour flight every day and occasionally flew two.

Initial submarine contacts were made on May 30 and May 31 by the destroyer escorts screening the formation. Attacks were made scoring hits which caused violent underwater explosions, heavy oil slicks and much Japanese debris.

*RO-105, England*

On June 10 the USS TAYLOR (DD 468), upon investigating the report of an oil slick and feather wake 15 miles on the starboard quarter of the formation established contact with another enemy submarine and laid several depth charge patterns. The submarine rose to the surface and was hit an estimated 10 times by 5" and 40 millimeter gunfire from the TAYLOR. The submarine sank stern first with the usual underwater explosions. *RO-111*

*26 June* Completing the assignment in the doldrums in late June, Task Group 12.2 was formed with command in the HOGGATT BAY, and proceeded to Eniwetok Atoll, Marshall Islands. During the period of July 5 to August 9 the Task Group conducted anti-submarine warfare, using air, surface and sound searches in support of Saipan, Tinian and Guam in the area 12 degrees 30 minutes to 14 degrees 30 minutes North, 150 to 153 degrees East. *19*

In support of the Marianas invasion, two Japanese submarines were destroyed by escorts of Task Group 12.2. The first was picked up by the HOGGATT BAY which directed the destroyer escort to the contact, and the second was sighted visually by a HOGGATT BAY lookout. *5 July - 9 Aug*

Upon completion of the Marianas campaign the HOGGATT BAY and escorts formed Task Group 30.7 with command in the HOGGATT BAY, and proceeded to Seeadler Harbor, Manus, Admiralty Islands via Eniwetok and Kwajalein Atolls, Marshall Islands. *Manus 30 Aug*

On September 1, Task Group 30.7 rendezvoused with Task Force 38 to furnish air, radar and sound submarine searches 50 miles in advance of the assault and invasion forces en route to the Palau Islands.

Early in October, while still in support of the Peleliu and Angaur invasion forces, the Task Group was dispatched to a position 7 degrees 44 minutes North 133 degrees 36 minutes East to investigate a possible submarine contact made earlier by a patrol plane.

After being directed to it by the HOGGATT BAY the destroyer escort made contact and scored several direct hits. *30 Oct I-177(2)*

Still conducting anti-submarine warfare in support of the newly won Palau Islands and in support of striking groups on the Philippines, the HOGGATT BAY and screen was ordered to rendezvous and report for duty with Commander Task Group 30.3 in order to provide anti-submarine protection and air coverage for two cruisers the USS HOUSTON AND USS CANBERRA that had been badly damaged off Formosa and were proceeding to Ulithi Atoll, Caroline Islands, at three knots. Menaced by submarines, at least one attack was thwarted, a feat which brought praise from Admiral Halsey. *11 Oct*

Ships that screened the HOGGATT BAY during these times in the several operating areas were the destroyers USS McCORD (DD 534), HAZLEWOOD (DD 531), HERRMANN (DD 532), HOEL (DD 768), NICHOLAS (DD 449), O'BANNON (DD 450), TAYLOR (DD 468), HOPEWELL (DD 681), RADFORD (DD 446), JENKINS (DD 447), LAVALETTE (DD 448), FLETCHER (DD 445), and destroyer escorts USS ENGLAND (DE 635), SPANGLER (DE 696), RABY (DE 698), GEORGE (DE 697), OSMUS (DE 701), WYMAN (DE 38), REYNOLDS (DE 42), LAKE (DE 301), DONOLDSON (DE 44), MILES (DE 183), STEEL (DE 8), BEBAS (DE 10), and SEID (DE 256).

Because of the urgency of the operations and the resulting heavy flying schedule the HOGGATT BAY and escorts remained in port only long enough to fuel and replenish. During these rush visits to port extensive engineering maintenance had to be done that weeks of steady operating had caused. Yet the planes were kept at top efficiency.

*as Ulithi 28 Oct*  
On October 29 the ship was ordered to return to the United States, but due to circumstances concurrent with the initial landings in the Philippines, the orders were cancelled and the month of November was spent with Carrier Division 29 furnishing air cover for ships in the vicinity of the Philippine Islands which were supporting the Leyte and Samar beachheads. *as Manus 27 Nov, the exercises*

In late December with Composite Squadron EIGHTY EIGHT (TBMs and FMs), commanded by Lieutenant Commander E. N. Webb, USN, aboard, the HOGGATT BAY and Carrier Divisions 28 and 29 were engaged in rehearsal amphibious operations in Huon Gulf, New Guinea. Upon return to Manus, Captain Saunders was relieved by Captain J. A. Briggs, U. S. Navy. *20 Dec*

On December 27 the HOGGATT BAY, now in Task Group 77.4 set course for the Lingayen Gulf landings on Luzon, Philippine Islands. The force of battleships, cruisers, destroyers, and escort carriers, was divided into two groups, the HOGGATT BAY with Carrier Division 29 in the forward group. Beginning on January 3, 1945 when the formation was in range of aircraft from the Philippines until the end of the operation and departure from Philippine waters about three weeks later, the ship went to General Quarters one hour before sunrise and remained at general quarters until at least one hour after sunset.

The formation proceeded to the Manila area via Suriagao Straits, Sulu, Mindoro, and South China Seas. Possibility of attack by surface ships and the continuous enemy air attacks en route demanded a heavy combat air patrol and anti-submarine patrol schedule. Sixteen HOGGATT BAY fighters met the enemy attackers on January 4th, thirty-two on January 5th and twenty on January 6th. Twelve torpedo planes were used in anti-submarine patrols on January 4th.

At 1901 on January 3, as the last fighter plane landed for the night, unidentified aircraft were picked up which attacked the formation of ships. A low wing, single engine plane attempting a suicide dive, crashed into the sea 100 yards astern of HMAS SHROPSHIRE, about 1000 yards from the HOGGATT BAY.

The following day at 1712 the formation was given air attack warning and several minutes later two enemy planes made unsuccessful suicide dives out of low cloud cover, crashing astern of the USS CALIFORNIA and the USS LUNGA POINT respectively. At the same time fire was opened on a formation of Japanese planes high on the starboard quarter; they turned, apparently discouraged at the heavy volume of AA fire, and attacked the rear group. Bombs were dropped on both formations. The OMMANEY BAY (CVE 79) was set afire by a suicide plane and later exploded and sank.

During the entire next day enemy planes were reported approaching from North, South, and East. The van and rear groups were under attack by suicide planes and bombers several times throughout the day. Many of the attacking planes were shot down, but the combination of



ships' AA fire and Combat Air Patrol planes could not prevent several of the ships from being hit and sustaining damage. In the van force a suicide plane crashed into the USS LOUISVILLE's #2 turret. In the rear formation the USS MANILA BAY (CVE 61) and a destroyer were hit.

Late in the afternoon of the same day the mine sweeping force, located ahead of the striking and carrier force, reported being attacked by two new Japanese destroyers and requested air support. Planes from the HOGGATT BAY and other carriers were quickly loaded and dispatched to attack the two destroyers. The planes found the USS BENNION (DD 662) holding off the attackers from the fragile mine-sweepers and proceeded to attack, in the face of heavy AA fire, with 500 pound bombs, torpedoes, and 50 caliber ammunition. Many near hits were made and fires were started on one destroyer. Both ships were left dead in the water as a result of one torpedo hit, the near hits with 500 pounders, strafing, and damage by shell fire from our destroyer.

Fighter pilot Ensign W. G. Mance USNR of the HOGGATT BAY's combat air patrol splashed one Zeke during the day.

Upon arrival at Lingayen Gulf on January 6, the battleships, cruisers, and most of the destroyers entered the Gulf for beach bombardment. The carriers screened by only a few destroyers, flew much needed cover from outside of Gulf.

While the battleships blasted the beaches, carrier planes bombed, rocketed, and strafed supply buildings, ground installations, fuel storage tanks, barges, ammunition dumps, railroad yards, communication lines and shipping, and scored a direct hit on an enemy submarine in the gulf; destroyed five aircraft in the air and on the ground.

Lieutenant (jg) C. L. Newburn, USNR, was shot down during the heat of battle, by friendly forces in the gulf after he had shot down an enemy Nick making a suicide dive on one of our cruisers. He was rescued by a friendly destroyer.

On the morning of January 13 the USS SALAMAU (CVE 96) was hit on her flight deck by a suicide plane whose bomb detached itself upon impact, went through the ship, pierced the skin below the water line and failed to detonate. The HOGGATT BAY's 5" gun opened fire on another enemy plane believed to be an Oscar making a long diving run from astern. From the angle of approach it was believed that this ship was the target, for it resembled the tactics the Japs had successfully used against the USS MANILA BAY earlier. All four shots fired at the planes appeared to burst on the target and after the fourth shot the attacking plane rolled over and dove into the sea.

Cover flights for the ground forces that had arrived in Lingayen Gulf on January 9 continued regardless of the constantly disturbed South China Sea that bounced the carrier around unmercifully putting the flight deck at odd angles. It was indeed a test and challenge to the ability of every pilot and landing signal officer.

On the afternoon of January 15, a 100 pound bomb from a battle-damaged HOGGATT BAY torpedo bomber accidentally exploded as the plane landed aboard. The pilot, Squadron Commander, Lieutenant Commander

Webb, two aircrewmembers, and eleven ship's company crew members died as a result of the blast. Fire broke out on the flight deck and catwalks but the flames were quickly extinguished by alert damage control and repair parties. The flight deck was back in operation that afternoon. Another torpedo bomber piloted by Ensign Carol E. Minick, USNR, was lost in action bombing enemy installations.

On January 17, orders were received to return to Ulithi via Surigao Straits with further orders to San Diego, California, for overhaul, repair and alterations to a flagship. From the time of commissioning until return to San Diego the ship crossed the equator about 64 times, not counting zigzag which is believed to be a record for U. S. Navy ships. SD  
15 Feb

During the Lingayen campaign all carriers experienced an increase in carrier crashes due to the condition of the sea. However, the operation was of only one month's duration and aircraft engineering maintenance squads were able to fulfill the schedule.

On April 6, 1945, the HOGGATT BAY, with Rear Admiral H. M. Martin, U. S. Navy, Commander Carrier Division 23, aboard, got underway from San Diego and proceeded to Pearl Harbor and Saipan where Composite Squadron NINETY NINE commanded by Lieutenant Commander R. R. Startzell, USN, came aboard. Thence the ship proceeded to Okinawa, to join the Fifth Fleet in support of the invasion. *via P.H., Ulithi*

Anti-aircraft gunnery on sleeves towed by ship's planes was conducted almost daily en route to and from operating areas and while waiting to fuel; on entering and leaving port anti-aircraft gunnery was conducted with service squadron planes towing.

From May 8 to June 24, 1945, the HOGATT BAY furnished daily, except for several days set aside for fueling and replenishment when only local patrols were launched, air cover for ships in the direct vicinity of Okinawa. She flew in direct support of troops, flew observation and photographic hops; made supply drops on advanced infantry patrols whose only available supply route was by plane due to the seas of mud that prevailed. She conducted strike and fighter sweeps on installations and airfields on Okinawa and surrounding islands as well as in the Sakishima Gunto area one hundred and twenty-five miles southwest.

Considerable damage was inflicted to enemy installations and equipment. Enemy airfield runways were bombed and equipment worked over with rockets and machine gun fire. Troops were constantly strafed and subjected to rocket fire.

When Carrier Division 22, whose normal operating area was the Sakishima group, required relief for fueling and replenishment, the carrier group of which the HOGGATT BAY was a part steamed into the area to continue the relentless bombing of operational airfields primarily on the islands of Ishigaki and Miyako.

While in this area on 7 June 1945 two enemy aircraft were able to approach the formation and crashed into the flight deck of the USS NATOMA BAY (CVE 62) causing slight damage. The other was shot down attempting a suicide dive on the USS SARGENT BAY (CVE 83). Hits by

the guns of the HOGGATT BAY's port battery were observed as the plane crashed into the water about one hundred yards ahead of the SARGENT BAY.

During the 47 days of continuous operation the ship entered a sheltered anchorage only twice for food, stores and bombs; then only during daylight hours each time. The sheltered anchorage, Kerama Retto, was in view of the constant dawn and dusk Jap suicide attacks. To fuel, the ship was forced to retire slightly south of Okinawa and fuel at sea with the possibility of enemy air attack. The screening vessels were fueled from the carriers between flight operations; the HOGGATT BAY fueling up to three in one morning of such exercise.

During the period of forty-seven days, Composite Squadron NINETY NINE flew 1327 sorties of all types of which 676 were combat missions. About fifty tons of bombs were dropped on enemy airfields and installations and an additional ninety tons of bombs were released on enemy ground installations other than those on airfields.

One thousand thirty-seven (1037) five-inch velocity aircraft rockets were expended plus hundreds of thousands of rounds of .50 caliber ammunition.

The results of these expenditures included two enemy aircraft destroyed in the air, two aircraft on the ground, eleven mortar and heavy gun positions, seventeen anti-aircraft batteries, twenty-three buildings, thirty-nine caves housing enemy troops and two trucks. Other items destroyed were small boats, oil and fuel dumps, supply dumps, troop shelters and one bridge.

In one day of operations, four "baby carriers," the fifth flying only local patrols, flew more than 300 combat sorties dropping 82 tons of bombs, fired 1400 rockets and expended thousands of rounds of .50 caliber ammunition.

In addition to the destruction wrought by Composite Squadron NINETY NINE's torpedo planes on enemy installations, Lieutenant M. D. Burchfield, USNR, and Lieutenant (jg) R. E. Rouillard, USNR, each accounted for a Jap plane. Lieutenant Burchfield and his division ran head-on into an Oscar near Kuma Shima having been directed to it by an anti-submarine patrol plane being seriously heckled. Lieutenant (jg) Rouillard braved heavy friendly AA fire to knock off a Jap plane making a suicide dive on a picket ship.

One FM 2 on June 22 while returning from Miyoko Shima was forced to make a water landing near the formation as a result of damage sustained from enemy AA fire.

In all operations, but especially at Lingayen Gulf and at Okinawa underway fueling of destroyers and fueling and gassing from a tanker were the order of the day and it was developed to a high degree of efficiency. Experiments were also made in rearming underway and necessary gear for the operation constructed.

It was the policy of this ship that no planes would be loaded with bombs on the hangar deck. All planes were loaded topside and the loading schedule arranged to be completed only a few minutes before

launching time to prevent serious explosions and fires on board in case of Kamikaze attack. Bombs taken from the magazine for the next flight would be kept in the skids on the flight deck until the previous flight landed. This process entailed extra handling of bombs and rockets but its safety factor proved its worth. In case of Kamikaze attack the bombs could have easily been jettisoned from the flight deck.

In the exhausting Okinawa campaign there were only thirteen instances in which there were no planes available to take the place of a plane scheduled for a flight and subsequently downed. There were 485 FMs and 284 TBMs, a total of 799 planes, down on the hangar deck for new parts, adjustments or checks of new parts. A small engineering unit was maintained topside to make minor repairs or adjustments that might prevent the plane from taking off on schedule.

The Okinawa campaign was followed by a rest at Leyte. During this period the HOGGATT BAY put to sea several days for refresher carrier landings, intercept training, strafing and rocket firing practice, and anti-aircraft gunnery.

On July 26, <sup>dep 28 July</sup> orders were received to proceed to Adak, Aleutian Islands, via Ulithi and Eniwetok to join the 4th Fleet. The operation for which the HOGGATT BAY was scheduled was cancelled due to the receipt of the Japanese surrender. The announcement of the Japanese surrender found the HOGGATT BAY in the center of the broadest expanse of water in the world, in the center of the vast Pacific Ocean, halfway between Wake Island and Adak, Alaska. This undoubtedly gave the ship the distinction of being one of the farthest ships from "nowhere" in the Navy at the time of the world-resounding news. The acceptance of surrender and occupation of Northern Honshu and Hokkaido by Commander North Pacific Fleet was quickly substituted for the prospective invasion. The HOGGATT BAY, as carrier flagship, flew air cover for the naval force that entered Nutsu Wan and for the ceremony that was held in the Harbor of the Ominato Naval Base.

Planes from this vessel located several prisoner-of-war camps, while in the area; and participated in supply drops consisting of food, newspapers, magazines and medical supplies to the prisoners. They also had the pleasure of evacuating Lieutenant Colonel Devereux, Marine Defense Commander of Wake Island at the time of its capture by the Japanese. On September 14, Captain F. N. Kivette, U. S. Navy relieved Captain Briggs of command.

Upon departure of Commander North Pacific Fleet from Japanese waters, the HOGGATT BAY was reassigned to the Fifth Fleet in order to cover the EIGHTH Army landing at Aomori, on Northern Honshu. Upon completion of the occupation the ship proceeded to Tokyo Bay immediately prior to its transfer to transport duty.

<sup>Dep 30 Sept for Guam</sup> By Directive dated January 1947 the USS HOGGATT BAY (CVE 75) was placed out of commission, in reserve, attached to the U. S. Atlantic Reserve Fleet.

Restencilled October 1950

USS HOGGATT BAY (CVE 75) earned five Battle Stars on the Asiatic-Pacific Area Service Medal, for participating in the following operations:

- 1 Star/Escort, Anti-submarine and Special Operations
  - Task Group 30.4 -- 22 May to 15 June 1944
  - Task Group 12.2 -- 5 July to 9 August 1944
- 1 Star/Western Caroline Islands Operation
  - Capture and Occupation of Southern Palau Islands -- 6 September to 14 October 1944
  - Assaults on the Philippine Islands -- 9-24 September 1944
- 1 Star/Leyte Operation
  - Leyte Landings -- 10 October to 29 November 1944
  - Luzon Attacks -- 15, 17 to 19 October; 5 to 6, 13 to 14, 19 to 25 November; and 14 to 16 December 1944
- 1 Star/Luzon Operation
  - Lingayen Gulf Landings -- 4 to 18 January 1945
- 1 Star/Okinawa Gunto Operation
  - Assault and Occupation of Okinawa Gunto -- 24 March to 30 June 1945

CVE 75 earned the Navy Unit Commendation for the following operations in the Pacific Area:

- VC-14, ASW, 22 May to 15 June 1944 -- Task Group 30.4 Pacific
- VC-14, ASW, 1 September to 9 October 1944 -- Task Group 30.7, Western Caroline Operations
- VC-14, ASW, 13 October to 27 October 1944 -- Task Group 30.7, with Task Group 30.3 Pacific
- VC-14, 13 to 27 November 1944 -- Leyte Operations
- VC-88, 4 to 18 January 1945 -- Luzon Operation
- VC-99, 8 May to 24 June 1945 -- Okinawa Gunto Operation

She also earned the Navy Occupation Service Medal, Pacific, for the periods of 7 to 30 September 1945; and 29 December 1945 to 10 January 1946.

\* \* \* \* \*

#### STATISTICS

OVERALL LENGTH	512 feet
BEAM	108 feet
SPEED	19 knots
DISPLACEMENT	7,800 tons

\* \* \* \* \*

Restencilled      October 1950

LCJ/hof

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET  
AIR FORCE, PACIFIC FLEET

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5200.9

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13 March 1945.

MEMORANDUM FOR:

Commander Air Force, Pacific Fleet.

Subject:

BRIEF of Report of Actions U.S.S. HOGGATT BAY (Capt. J.A. Briggs) During Lingayen Gulf Operations 1-23 January 1945, R/S 1839.

COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS.

1. Jamming. Evidences of jamming occurred on nearly every circuit. 4170 kcs was jammed so effectively at times that communications were impossible. It appeared as though at least a dozen Jap stations were holding down their keys, giving evidence of bagpipe station. On 2020 kcs a station using the unlisted call "Teaball" was heard calling various bases with a strength of about 5 but he fooled no one and was ineffective. Evidence of apparent Jap transmissions were heard on 500 kcs. Copies of three such transmissions follow as completely as we were able to copy them. Two SOS interceptions were made on this circuit and reported to OTC. On January 8 beginning at 0625 GCT, NTF was completely blocked out at intervals on 8830 kcs by a series of long dashes. The interfering signal was exactly the same frequency to the last cycle as NTF. This was the only time NTF appeared to intentionally jammed. Most of any missed traffic occurred during the two hour period before dawn each morning on 4415 kcs. At this time there was strong interference and 13,245 kcs could not be picked up at all. 8830 kcs the only remaining frequency at this time was weak and punctured with static. Another compromise frequency is needed for this general period. Again on 2020 kcs on January 8 from 2000 to 0000 GCT jamming was attempted by using a record which repeated over and over "on the ball". In no case where enemy jamming was noticed was use made of secondary frequencies provided.

Apparent Japanese transmission referred to above:

- (1) MAME MAME MAME DE TAQ TAQ MAME MAME DE TAQ TAQ  
GW56 F MAME AL BQYAAW PD.. -- B M AR AL420 1 U AS  
11 N Y ITAAS M

500 KCS 1/14/45

CHARACTERS UNDERLINED SENT AS ONE CHARACTER

DOTS AND DASHES REPRESENT CHARACTERS AS SENT BUT NOT UNDERSTOOD.

- (2) S \_ \_ \_ . S \_ \_ \_ . NAFUR UAAA N NARAR FVAAA V B1153 NAKAR V IAR  
F RPT \_ \_ \_ \_ RVAAA NARAR VFAAA V B1153 NAKAR V 1 AR F G 1 F  
G VA

CHARACTERS UNDERLINED SENT AS ONE CHARACTER. DOTS AND DASHES REPRESENT CHARACTERS AS SENT BUT NOT UNDERSTOOD.

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13 March 1945

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BRIEF of Report of Actions U.S.S. HOGGATT BAY  
(Capt. J.A. Briggs) During Lingayen Gulf  
Operations 1-23 January 1945, R/S 1839.

- (3) IAR FRPT TRPT NAFUF V NARAR FV 11AAA53 NAK VIAR V NAFUF V AAANAR  
F VV B11 53 NAKAR V I AR  
500 KCS 1/14/45.

2. Jap Suicide and Bombing Tactics. At least three different types of approaches used by suicide planes were observed during the entire operation.

3. The first encountered was a high speed run from 30 to 40 miles starting as a crossing raid then quickly turning toward the formation and approaching at 240 to 300 knots at 15 to 20 thousand feet. This type of raid showed no hesitation such as pondering over which target looks the best. A ship is picked at long range and a screaming dive is started at approximately five miles from the target. The aircraft escorting the suicider orbit and weave splitting into numerous groups at ranges of 8 to 10 miles and watch the proceedings eventually retiring in a series of climbs and dives. Under these tactics the radar screen becomes completely confused with friendly and bogie indications. This breakup and orbit puts doubt in your mind as to whether they are coming in or just thinking about it. The answer comes altogether too quickly.

4. The second type of raid observed was bogies of four or five planes each appearing from two or more directions, generally in the same quadrant. These bogies appear at 30 or 40 miles in a steep climb making for the high cloud cover. Upon closing the formation to approximately ten miles, each raid splits into numerous groups causing the usual confused mass on the screen of friendlies and bogies. These groups, presumably the escorting fighters, weave, climb, and dive making short range interception difficult. After six to eight minutes of these antics, the escorting groups retire, still well split up, drawing off some of the VF cover as they leave. It is believed that the suicide planes are left directly over the formation flying blind in the high cloud cover. After the confusion below then calms down and the radar screens are well clear of all bogies, the suicide boys go to work more or less taking the formation by surprise. A careful search of all high cloud cover is highly recommended during all raids. The high altitude CAP may not be able to dive after the planes, but they might flush the group or planes from its cover and pass valuable information to the formation below. (See note on page five)

5. The third type of approach is low level, high speed. This raid usually will appear on the radar screen between 22 and 15 miles, if at all. If ASP's are being flown, SNAP patrols, etc., the length of time it takes to analyze the pip as to its friendly nature, weak IFF or friendly with no IFF, is costly. Visual sighting by the screen is usually your first warning. Too late for CAP activity. These suiciders also seem to be escorted, two planes with each. They remain outside of gun range at low altitude, observe results, and retire on the water, not visible to air search radar. The SG can best pick up these raids, but they also see many friendly planes during a day's work and some little time is consumed checking SG reports on the SK. The low level suicide attackers are seen to pull up into a steep climb near their target, roll on their backs split - S fashion, and dive. You are lucky to get two or three good plots from your radars on an attack like this.



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Operations 1-23 January 1945, R/S 1839.

6. One other type of attack was observed coordinated with a suicide dive - medium high level bombing. It is believed bombs are dropped more or less without regard for value of target in order to distract attention from the plane or planes commencing their dives. These planes may have retired low on the water after their drops, for very poor results were observed in radar tracking their retirement.
7. It is believed that the first two types of raids may be discouraged or successfully broken up before reaching the formation if they are intercepted at maximum range with a maximum number of fighters. It appears that an actual interception is not necessarily required. If many fighters are vectored into the path of their approach, before the usual break-up, and are seen by the incoming planes, it is a possibility that they may be deterred.
8. It seems that a Jap flight never flies level within forty miles of its target, this makes interception extremely difficult. They seem to employ a series of climbs and dives with complete break-ups at the strategic moment.
9. During the passage through the inland waters of the Philippines where land was always within 15 miles or less, the SK radar was quite ineffective due to the heavy land indications on the scope and severe side lobing. Tracking was spotty at best and determination of altitude rough. An estimation within five thousand feet of actual altitude was a guess at best. The best radar reports were received from the two Australian Cruisers accompanying the formations, both of which were equipped with altitude determination radars. They also seemed to experience little difficulty at tracking over land. Many times this base has as few as six plots on a bogey which should have been visible on the screen for sixty miles or better.
10. Controlled interceptions during this time were impossible. To vector your fighters in the general direction of the bogey and hope they would see something was the only alternative. It worked on occasions. Many more interceptions would have been successful if we had had faster planes. Not being able to control your interceptions, the fighters often times made tallyhoes but could not close the bogey, who invariably ducked into a cloud and disappeared.
11. The Jap airmen made excellent use of land and cloud cover. They displayed a complete understanding of the capabilities and limitations of our radars and seemed to make full use of them on every occasion.
12. Jap Use of "Window". "Window" was used numerous times throughout this formation's passage through the inland waters of the Philippines. Only once was a relatively large quantity of it used and then it only covered an area of approximately a dime on the PPI. At this time, as on most occurrences, it was used upon retirement. It lasted for 40 minutes indicating a drop from about 10 to 12 thousand feet. At other times it was used by single planes approaching the formation in order to increase the indication on the screen between 10 and 15 miles. This had some bearing on the confused mass of indications in that area during periods of attack. The radar operators had no difficulty recognizing the use of window and could readily distinguish it from

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(Capt. J.A. Briggs) During Lingayen Gulf  
Operations 1-23 January 1945, R/S 1839.

real targets despite the fact that none of the operators had had the benefit of schooling in the recognition of "window". Its extremely bouncy characteristic and lack of motion gave it away immediately. Tracking of real targets was accomplished at the height of its use. As has been said, most often was it used on retirement and then only in widely separated areas in quantities only to produce the indication of one small plane.

#### AIR OPERATIONS.

13. Air Schedule. It is recommended that a minimum of 45 minutes be allowed between successive landing and launches. Difficulty was encountered in meeting the schedule when returning flights were delayed excessively. In this connection, it is recommended that LCAPs be launched sufficiently early to relieve the returning group in time to land on schedule.

14. Enemy Tactics. With the exception of one high altitude bombing attack and two apparent low level torpedo runs made by Japanese planes in which no torpedoes were seen to drop all attacks observed by gunnery personnel on board this ship were suicide attacks, both from high altitudes and low levels. It was the concerted opinion of battery officers, lookouts and control officers that the Japanese pilots were exceedingly skillful and crafty and that their tactics in working suicide runs presented a minimum of time in which enemy planes could be taken under fire. On three occasions enemy planes were observed to make attacks low on the water in such a position as to direct the fire of one or more ships towards other ships in the formation. In addition on several occasions diversion tactics were observed as follows:

    Suicide planes were escorted by one or more planes of the same type whose objective was to draw the attention and fire of the ships away from the "suicider", who dove out of the sun, cloud cover, or opposite side of the ship attacked or the formation.

15. Friendly planes during Enemy Air Attacks. During every attack made on ships of this formation the presence of friendly aircraft around and over the formation was noted contrary to the instructions contained in the operations order which provided that upon the sounding of "flash red", friendly planes were to vacate the area and not approach within a minimum slant range of 10,000 yards from the formation. The presence of friendly planes, invariably distracted control personnel and the gun crews from making more accurate observation of approaching enemy planes and created a situation that could have been disastrous. However, if attacks occur during launchings, obviously, friendly planes will be in the vicinity.

#### HEALTH

16. During the whole action the ship remained at general quarters and modified condition "Able", readiness condition "One, easy" for 16½ days.

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BRIEF of Report of Actions U.S.S. HOGGATT BAY  
(Capt. J.A. Briggs) During Lingayen Gulf  
Operations 1-23 January 1945, R/S 1839.

17. The health of the crew remained remarkably good. The number of personnel appearing for sick call dropped from an average of 30 per day to 5 per day. There were two cases of neuroses and three cases of fatigue which made an uneventful recovery after a good night's rest preceded by three grains of nembutal.

18. The main reason for the crew remaining in good health must be ascribed to the fact that they were well fed and were supplied with plenty of fresh water from the canteens, portable water containers and scuttlebutts. Meals were served by designated personnel at the various battle stations. Breakfast consisted of meat and jam sandwiches, fruit juice or tomato juice and coffee. At 1000, hot soup and crackers were served. Sandwiches were again served at noon with hot beans, corn or peas. Hot coffee was also issued at this time. At 1500, fruit juices, cake or cookies were available to all. A hot meal was served almost daily after the evening general quarters. Another reason for the well-being of the crew can be ascribed to the fact that 50% of the crew could relax at their battle stations during readiness condition "One, easy".

Comment by Ass't. CofS for Operations: The AN/APA-6; VT(N) radar now being furnished for upward searching may facilitate detection of these bogies. (See paragraph 6.)

DISTRIBUTION LIST ATTACHED.

Briefed by Operational  
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*H. P. Davison*

H. P. DAVISON  
Commander, USNR

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UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET  
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Serial: 002003

22 August 1945.

From: Commander Air Force, Pacific Fleet.  
To: Distribution List.

Subject: BRIEF of Action Report, U.S.S. HOGGAT BAY (Capt. J. A. Briggs)  
for Period 8 May - 24 June 1945, R/S 020344.

VISUAL COORDINATOR.

1. Any radar definitely displays a limitation in its inability to keep an accurate picture of the activities of aircraft close to the formation. Lookout reports should be able to keep CIC informed of what it cannot see from below decks; however, they do not do this and liaison between the two functions has been poor. At General Quarters and times of heavy air activity it has been advantageous to station an officer on the visual fighter director's platform adjacent to Gunnery Control and the signal bridge, to feed information into CIC as he sees it from his vantage point. Similarly, information has been transmitted to him from CIC in order to better visualize what he is apt to see. This officer has also been able to aid the Gunnery Control personnel by keeping a brief plot of all air contacts and illustrate their activities graphically on a miniature plotting board. In lieu of a separate sound-power channel, the JX phone on the signal bridge has been used, which is a relatively clear channel during those conditions. It is recommended that such a station be manned until all lookouts and their reports can be coordinated in such a manner that CIC receives the full benefit of the information.

2. Communications Personnel: By borrowing an additional five men from other divisions it was possible to create a watch in three to handle the load created by flagship operations. This greatly increased the efficiency of the radio gang who had previously been forced to stand on a watch and watch basis. It is recommended that the allowance of radiomen for flagships of this type be increased. Thorough training again paid big dividends by enabling all strikers to effectively stand watch on any circuit.

Comment: The allowance of radiomen for flagships has been increased by four.

AIR OPERATIONS.

3. Air Support: It appeared that air support control at times made unreasonable requests without regard to the problems of CVE operations or the facilities CVEs have for sending quick direct support missions to the beach. However, every effort was made and the CVEs succeeded in complying with nearly every request from CASCUC.

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Serial: 002003

22 August 1945.

Subject: BRIEF of Action Report, U.S.S. HOGGATT BAY (Capt. J. A. Briggs)  
for Period 8 May - 24 June 1945, R/S 020344.

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COMMENTS OF COMMANDER VC-99.


4. Embarkation of Squadron: The squadron should be embarked a sufficient period before entering the combat area to permit the pilots to become acclimated to an entirely new way of living and working, and to permit the ship and squadron to have sufficient time to work out the problems of liaison between Air Plot, Fly Control, and Flight Deck and Catapult control and the squadron. In this way, the ship's policies and the squadron policies might have a chance to blend into a smooth working unified policy, and the ship's and squadron's officers and men might have a better chance to become acquainted, professionally as well as personally.

5. Take-off and Landing Procedures: It is felt that VC squadrons should be more thoroughly trained in the take-off and landing patterns. The normal four-plane break-off is not practical in most cases where there are a number of carriers in formation landing planes at the same time. This squadron had to alter its methods radically from those used in training procedure, especially since in this case planes were for the most part recovered in the center of a six-ship formation. Squadrons should be forcefully impressed of the necessity of close-in patterns and tight orbits of the ship, both in the case of the division awaiting its turn to enter the landing circle and the second section of the division actually landing; this second being in its one-circle orbit before entering the final approach pattern. The new approach doctrine prescribed by ComAirPac has met with the high approval of all pilots. It dispenses with the radical turn from the downwind leg, and the abrupt turn at the ramp before the cut. It encourages smoothness of approach and allows for easier corrections of errors in judgment.

6. IFF: The IFF gave a minimum amount of trouble, but unless squadrons and ships thoroughly indoctrinate personnel in its upkeep and in the need for constant checks, trouble will occur. Aircrewmembers should be given a thorough check-out in airborne trouble-shooting.

7. Survival: With regard to survival, it might be mentioned that the Dilbert notes and technical orders are not talking through their hats when they comment on the necessity for all pilots to extricate themselves completely from their parachute harness when preparing for take-offs and landings, and for the necessity for tight safety belts and shoulder straps. Experience could be a hard teacher in showing the need for this precaution. Several pilots in this squadron owe their lives to correct procedure in this line.

Comment: The necessity for tight safety belts and shoulder straps is well supported by experience; however preponderance of opinion by combat units further indicates that pilots should not try to extricate themselves from their parachute harness. Recommendations concerning attachment of pilots' parachute harnesses during water landings are covered by AirPac Technical Bulletin No. 54TB-45 and Flight Safety Bulletin 13-45.

  
M. E. A. Gouin  
by direction

(21 August 1945)

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IN FORCE, PACIFIC FLEET

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		V. Adm. 2nd in Com. BPF	1
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CV 3,6,9,10,11,12,14,15,16, 17,18,19,20,21,31,36,38,39	1 ea.	Comm. Com 13th CarRon BPF	1
		U.S.N.L.O., Hqtrs. BritPacFlt, Sydney	1
CVL 22,24,25,26,27,28,29,30	1 ea.	HMS INDOMITABLE, VICTORIOUS, INDEFATIGABLE, FORMIDABLE, IMPLACABLE	1 ea.
CVE 27,28,29,57,61,62,69,70, 71,72,74,75,76,77,78,80, 81,82,83,84,85,86,87,90, 93,94,96,97,101,103,104, 106,107,109,111	2 ea.	HMS VENERABLE, VENGEANCE, COLOSSUS, GLORY	1 ea.
CVE 1,9,11,12,13,16,18,20, 23,31,55,58,64,65,66,68, 88,91,92,98,99,100,102	1 ea.	CNO (Op-16-V)	3
		CNO (Editor CIC)	1
		Chief, BuAer	1
		BuAer, Head of Engr. Div.	2
		BuAer, Ship Install. Branch	2
		BuAer, Power Plant Design Branch	2
		BuAer, Radio & Electrical Branch	2
		BuMedandSurg, Aviation Section	2
CAG 2,8,13,14,21,26,28,35,51, 60,89,92,95,99,100, (N) 52, (N) 55, (N) 63	1 ea.	Chief, BuOrd	2
		Chief, BuShips	2
VC 3,4,7,14,65,66,98	1 ea.	ComAirLant (ACI Center)	1
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TOTAL 308



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~~AV. COMM. OF. H. S. S. HOGGATT BAY (CVE 15)~~

# HISTORY OF USS HOGGATT BAY (CVE 15)

of 27 SEP 53

BY *E. Handelman* DATE

The U.S.S. HOGGATT BAY, twenty-first of the CASABLANCA Class carriers was commissioned on January 11, 1944 at the Naval Station Astoria, Oregon. The keel had been laid on August 17, 1943 and she had been launched on December 4, 1943. Following a brief commissioning ceremony, Captain J. D. Barner, U.S. Navy, Commanding Officer of the naval station, transferred command to Captain W. V. Saunders, U. S. Navy.

Through the month of January the ship was outfitted at the Naval Station and then proceeded to the Naval Repair Base, San Diego, California, via Illahee, Washington for ammunition and torpedos; Bremerton, Washington for engine tests, degaussing, performance statistics, bomb loading; Alameda, California for aviation supplies and arrived at San Diego February 22.

During the early part of March, exercises including anti-aircraft and surface gunnery, aircraft deck spotting and tactical drills were conducted under the supervision of the Commander Operational Training Command, Pacific Fleet.

The ship got underway for Pearl Harbor on March 10 transporting aircraft and personnel, and returned to San Diego.

The latter part of March was utilized in conducting extensive aircraft operations and general training. Captain Saunders made the first take-off and landed aboard the HOGGATT BAY on March 27.

Leaving the United States on May 1 with Composite Squadron FOURTEEN (TBMs and FMs), commanded by Lieutenant Commander F. H. Tammany, USNR, and later by Lieut. C. H. Obrist, USN, the HOGGATT BAY in command of Task Group 30.4 proceeded to an enemy submarine area 1° South to 2° North, 148° to 152° East, to conduct ~~intensive~~ air, sound and surface submarine searches, augmented by Black Cat planes at night from nearby Enirau Island.

The escort carrier had already proven itself in the Atlantic. In this case, in the Pacific, it proved to be perfectly suited to anti-submarine warfare. Flying thirty to forty flights a day, often two torpedo planes flying from 0200 until dawn, the aircraft were able to keep the submarines submerged a large part of the time and the destroyers and destroyer escorts gave them no rest underwater.

Already versed in anti-submarine warfare, VC FOURTEEN conducted extensive indoctrination aboard the HOGGATT BAY enroute to the operating area and were in condition for the strenuous assignment. Torpedo plane pilots flew at least one four-hour flight every day and occasionally flew two.

Initial submarine contacts were made on May 30 and May 31 by the destroyer escorts screening the formation. Attacks were made scoring hits which caused violent underwater explosions, heavy oil slicks and much Japanese debris.

On June 10 the U.S.S. TAYLOR (DD-468), upon investigating the report from ~~Lieut. G. A. Elliott, USNR, leader of the airborne combat air patrol~~ of an

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oil slick and feather wake 15 miles on the starboard quarter of the formation established contact with another enemy submarine and laid several depth charge patterns. The submarine rose to the surface and was hit an estimated 10 times by 5" and 40mm gunfire from the TAYLOR. The submarine sank stern first with the usual underwater explosions.

Completing the assignment in the doldrums in late June, Task Group 12.2 was formed with command in the HOGGATT BAY, and proceeded to Eniwetok Atoll, Marshall Islands. During the period of July 5 to August 9 the Task Group conducted anti-submarine warfare, using air, surface and sound searches, in support of Saipan, Tinian and Guam in the area 12 degrees 30 minutes to 14 degrees 30 minutes North, 150 to 153 degrees East.

In support of the Marianas invasion, two Japanese submarines were destroyed by escorts of Task Group 12.2. The first was picked up by the HOGGATT BAY ~~which~~ <sup>which</sup> directed the destroyer escort to the contact, and the second was sighted visually by a HOGGATT BAY lookout.

Upon completion of the Marianas campaign the HOGGATT BAY and escorts formed Task Group 30.7 with command in the HOGGATT BAY, and proceeded to Seeadler Harbor, Manus, Admiralty Islands via Eniwetok and Kwajalein Atolls, Marshall Islands.

On September 1, Task Group 30.7 <sup>rendezvoused</sup> ~~was assigned~~ with Task Force 38 to furnish air, radar and sound submarine searches 50 miles in advance of the assault and invasion forces enroute to the Palau Islands.

Early in October, while still in support of the <sup>Palau</sup> ~~Palau~~ and Angaur invasion forces, the Task Group was dispatched to a position 7 degrees 44 minute North 133 degrees 36 minutes East to investigate a possible submarine contact made earlier by a patrol plane.

After being directed to it by the HOGGATT BAY the destroyer escort made contact and scored several direct hits.

Still conducting anti-submarine warfare in support of the newly-won Palau Islands and in support of striking groups on the Philippines, the HOGGATT BAY and screen was ordered to <sup>rendezvous</sup> ~~report~~ and report for duty with Commander Task Group 30.3 in order to provide anti-submarine protection and air coverage for two cruisers the U.S.S. HOUSTON and U.S.S. CANBERRA that had been badly damaged off Formosa and were proceeding to Ulithi Atoll, Caroline Islands, at three knots. Menaced by submarines, at least one attack was thwarted, a feat which brought praise from Admiral Halsey.

Ships that screened the HOGGATT BAY during these times in the several operating areas were the destroyers USS McCORD (DD-534), HAZLEWOOD (DD-531), HERRMANN (DD-532), HOEL (DD-768), NICHOLAS (DD-449), O'BANNON (DD-450), TAYLOR (DD-468), HOPEWELL (DD-681), RADFORD (DD-446), JENKINS (DD-447), LAVALETTE (DD-448), FLETCHER (DD-445), and destroyer escorts USS ENGLAND (DE-635), SPANGLER (DE-696), RABY (DE-698), GEORGE (DE-697), OSMUS (DE-701), WYMAN (DE-38), REYNOLDS (DE-42), LAKE (DE-301), DONOLDSON (DE-44), MILES (DE-183), STEELE (DE-8), BEBAS (DE-10), and SEID (DE-256).

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Because of the urgency of the operations and the resulting heavy flying schedule the HOGGATT BAY and escorts remained in port only long enough to fuel and replenish. During these rush visits to port extensive engineering maintenance had to be done that weeks of steady operating had caused. Yet the planes were kept at top efficiency.

On October 29 the ship was ordered to return to the United States, but due to circumstances concurrent with the initial landings in the Philippines, the orders were cancelled and the month of November was spent with Carrier Division 29 furnishing air cover for ships in the vicinity of the Philippine Islands which were supporting the Leyte and Samar beachheads.

In late December with Composite Squadron EIGHTY EIGHT (TEMs and FMs), commanded by Lieut. Comdr. E. N. Webb, USN, aboard, the HOGGATT BAY and Carrier Divisions 28 and 29 were engaged in rehearsal amphibious operations in Hunn Gulf, New Guinea. Upon return to Manus, Captain Saunders was relieved by Captain J. A. Briggs, U. S. Navy.

On December 27 the HOGGATT BAY, now in Task Group 77.4, set course for the Lingayen Gulf landings on Luzon, Philippine Islands. The force of Battleships, cruiser, destroyers, and escort carriers, was divided into two groups, the HOGGATT BAY with Carrier Division 29 in the forward group. Beginning on January 3, 1945 when the formation was in range of aircraft from the Philippines until the end of the operation and departure from Philippine waters about three weeks later, the ship went to General Quarters one hour before sunrise and remained at general quarters until at least one hour after sunset.

The formation proceeded to the Manila area via Suriagao Straits, Sulu, Mindore, and South China Seas. Possibility of attack by surface ships and the continuous enemy air attacks enroute demanded a heavy Combat Air Patrol and Anti-Submarine Patrol schedule. Sixteen HOGGATT BAY fighters met the enemy attackers on January 4th, thirty two on January 5th and twenty on January 6th. Twelve torpedo planes were used in anti-submarine patrols on January 4th.

At 1901 on January 3, as the last fighter plane landed for the night, unidentified aircraft were picked up which attacked the formation of ships. A low wing, single engine plane attempting a suicide dive, crashed into the sea 100 yards astern of HMAS SHROPSHIRE, about 1000 yards from the HOGGATT BAY. ~~Darkness prevented observing the activities of the other planes, however, no damage resulted from the attack.~~

The following day at 1712 the formation was given air attack warning and several minutes later two enemy planes made unsuccessful suicide dives out of low cloud cover, crashing astern of the U.S.S. CALIFORNIA and the U.S.S. LUNGA POINT respectively. At the same time fire was opened on a formation of Japanese planes high on the starboard quarter; they turned, apparently discouraged at the heavy volume of AA fire, and attacked the rear group. Bombs were dropped on both formations. The OMMANNEY BAY (CVE-79) was set afire by a suicide plane and later exploded and sank.

During the entire next day enemy planes were reported approaching from North, South, and East. The van and rear groups were under attack by suicide

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planes and bombers several times throughout the day. Many of the attacking planes were shot down, but the combination of ship's AA fire and CAP planes could not prevent several of the ships from being hit and sustaining damage. In the van force a suicide plane crashed into the U.S.S. LOUISVILLE'S #2 turret. In the rear formation the U.S.S. MANILA BAY (CVE-61) and a destroyer were hit.

Late in the afternoon of the same day the mine sweeping force, located ahead of the striking and carrier force, reported being attacked by two new Japanese destroyers and requested air support. Planes from the HOGGATT BAY And other carriers were quickly loaded and despatched to attack the two destroyers. The planes found the U.S.S. BENNION (DD-662) holding off the attackers from the fragile minesweepers and proceeded to attack, in the face of heavy AA fire, with 500# bombs, torpedos, and 50 cal. ammunition. Many near hits were made and fires were started on one destroyer. Both ships were left dead in the water as a result of one torpedo hit, the near hits with 500 pounders, strafing, and damage by shell fire from our destroyer.

Fighter pilot Ensign W. G. Mance USNR of the HOGGATT BAY'S combat air patrol splashed one Zeke during the day.

Upon arrival at Lingayen Gulf on January 6, the battleships, cruisers, and most of the destroyers entered the Gulf for beach bombardment. The carriers screened by only a few destroyers, flew much needed cover from outside of Gulf.

While the battleships blasted the beaches, carrier planes bombed, rocketed, and strafed supply buildings, ground installations, fuel storage tanks, barges, ammunition dumps, railroad yards, communication lines, shipping, and scored a direct hit on an enemy submarine in the gulf, destroyed five aircraft in the air and on the ground.

Lieut. (jg) C. L. Newburn, USNR was shot down during the heat of battle, by friendly forces in the gulf after he had shot down an enemy Nick making a suicide dive on one of our cruisers. He was rescued by a friendly destroyer.

On the morning of January 13 the U.S.S. SALAMAU (CVE-96) was hit on her flight deck by a suicide plane whose bomb detached itself upon impact, went through the ship, pierced the skin below the water line and failed to detonate. The HOGGATT BAY'S 5" gun opened fire on another enemy plane believed to be an Oscar making a long diving run from astern. From the angle of approach it was believed that this ship was the target, for it resembled the tactics the Japs had successfully used against the U.S.S. MANILA BAY earlier. All four shots fired at the plane appeared to burst on the target and after the fourth shot the attacking plane rolled over and dove into the sea.

Cover flights for the ground forces that had arrived in Lingayen Gulf on January 9 continued regardless of the constantly disturbed South China Sea that bounced the carrier around unmercifully putting the flight deck at odd angles. It was indeed a test and challenge to the ability of a every pilot and landing signal officer.

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On the afternoon of January 15, a 100 lb. bomb from a battle-damaged HOGGATT BAY torpedo bomber accidentally exploded as the plane landed aboard. The pilot, Squadron Commander, Lieut. Comdr. Webb, two aircrewmembers, and eleven ship's company crew members died as a result of the blast. Fire broke out on the flight deck and catwalks but the flames were quickly extinguished by alert damage control and repair parties. The flight deck was back in operation that afternoon. Another torpedo bomber piloted by Ensign Carol E. Minick, USNR, was lost in action bombing enemy installations.

On January 17, orders were received to return to Ulithi via Surigao Straits with further orders to San Diego, California, for overhaul, repair and alterations to a flagship. From the time of commissioning until, return to San Diego the ship crossed the equator about 64 times, not counting zig-zag, which is believed to be a record for U. S. Navy ships.

<sup>carrier</sup> During the Lingayen campaign all carriers experienced an increase in ~~carrier~~ crashes due to the condition of the sea. However, the operation was of only one month's duration and aircraft engineering maintenance squads were able to fulfill the schedule.

On April 6, 1945, the HOGGATT BAY, with Rear Admiral H. M. Martin, U. S. Navy, Commander Carrier Division 23, aboard, got under way from San Diego and proceeded to Pearl Harbor and Saipan where Composite Squadron NINETY NINE commanded by Lieut. Comdr. R. R. Startzell, USN, came aboard. Thence the ship proceeded to Okinawa, to join the Fifth Fleet in support of the invasion.

~~It was the policy of this ship to train every day the ship was not in combat.~~

Anti-aircraft gunnery on sleeves towed by ship's planes was conducted almost daily enroute to and from operating areas and while waiting to fuel; on entering and leaving port anti-aircraft gunnery was conducted with service squadron planes towing. ~~Extensive squadron indoctrination was given immediately upon reporting aboard; intercept problems, bomb, rocket and machine gun firing, formation and breakup, etc.~~

From May 8 to June 24, 1945, the HOGGATT BAY furnished daily, except for several days set aside for fueling and replenishment when only local patrols were launched, air cover for ships in the direct vicinity of Okinawa. She flew in direct support of troops, flew observation and photographic hops, made supply drops on advanced infantry patrols whose only available supply route was by plane due to the seas of mud that prevailed. She conducted strikes and fighter sweeps on installations and airfields on Okinawa and surrounding islands as well as in the Sakishima Gunto area one hundred and twenty-five miles southwest.

Considerable damage was inflicted to enemy installations and equipment. Enemy airfield runways were bombed and equipment worked over with rockets and machine gun fire. Troops were constantly strafed and subjected to rocket fire.

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When Carrier Division 22, whose normal operating area was the Sakishima group, required relief for fueling and replenishment, the carrier group of which the HOGGATT BAY was a part steamed into the area to continue the relentless bombing of operational airfields primarily on the islands of Ishigaki and Miyako.

While in this area on 7 June 1945 two enemy aircraft were able to approach the formation, and one crashed into the flight deck of the U.S.S. NATOMA BAY (CVE-62) causing slight damage. The other was shot down attempting a suicide dive on the U.S.S. SARGENT BAY (CVE-83). Hits by the guns of the HOGGATT BAY'S port battery were observed as the plane crashed into the water about one hundred yards ahead of the Sargent Bay.

During the 47 days of continuous operation the ship entered a sheltered anchorage only twice for food, stores and bombs, then only during daylight hours each time. The sheltered anchorage, Kerama Retto, was in view of the constant dawn and dusk Jap suicide attacks. To fuel, the ship was forced to retire slightly south of Okinawa and fuel at sea with the possibility of enemy air attack. The screening vessels were fueled from the carriers between flight operations, the HOGGATT BAY fueling up to three in one morning of such exercises.

During the period of forty-seven days, Composite Squadron NINETY NINE flew 1327 sorties of all types of which 676 were combat missions. About fifty tons of bombs were dropped on enemy airfields and installations and an additional ninety tons of bombs were released on enemy ground installations other than those on airfields.

One thousand thirty-seven (1037) five-inch high velocity aircraft rockets were expended plus hundreds of thousands of rounds of .50 caliber ammunition.

The results of these expenditures included two enemy aircraft destroyed in the air, two aircraft on the ground, eleven mortar and heavy gun positions, seventeen anti-aircraft batteries, twenty-three buildings, thirty-nine caves housing enemy troops and two trucks. Other items destroyed were small boats, oil and fuel dumps, supply dumps, troop shelters and one bridge.

In one day of operations, four "baby carriers", the fifth flying only local patrols, flew more than 300 combat sorties dropping 82 tons of bombs, fired 1400 rockets and expended thousands of rounds of .50 caliber ammunition.

In addition to the destruction wrought by Composite Squadron NINETY NINE'S torpedo planes on enemy installations, Lieut. M. D. Burchfield, USNR, and Lieut. (jg) R. E. Rouillard, USNR, each accounted for a Jap plane. Lieut. Burchfield and his division ran head-on into an Oscar near Kuma Shima having been directed to it by an anti-submarine patrol plane being seriously heckled. Lieut. (jg) Rouillard braved heavy friendly AA fire to knock off a Jap plane making a suicide dive on a picket ship.

One FM-2 on June 22 while returning from Miyoko Shima was forced to make a water landing near the formation as a result of damage sustained from enemy AA fire.

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In all operations, but especially at Lingayen Gulf and at Okinawa, under-way fueling of destroyers and fueling and gassing from a tanker were the order of the day and it was developed to a high degree of efficiency. Experiments were also made in rearming underway and necessary gear for the operation constructed.

It was the policy of this ship that no planes would be loaded with bombs on the hangar deck. All planes were loaded topside and the loading scheduled arranged to be completed only a few minutes before launching time to prevent serious explosions and fires onboard in case of Kamikaze attack. Bombs taken from the magazine for the next flight would be kept in the skids on the flight deck until the previous flight landed. This process entailed extra handling of bombs and rockets but its safety factor proved its worth. In case of Kamikaze attack the bombs could have easily been jettisoned from the flight deck. ~~With sufficient time provisioning boom on the port side of the fantail, however where time was of the essence as was the case at Kerama Retto in April, May and June, provisions, bombs, rockets and ammunition were also brought aboard by the air plane boom and emergency rigs on spensons #1 and #2 and on the fantail starboard side.~~

In the exhausting Okinawa campaign there were only thirteen instances in which there were no planes available to take the place of a plane scheduled for a flight and subsequently downed. There were 485 FMs and 284 TBMs, a total of 799 planes, down on the hangar deck for new parts, adjustments or checks of new parts. A small engineering unit was maintained topside to make minor repairs or adjustments that might prevent the plane from taking off on schedule.

The Okinawa campaign was followed by a rest at Leyte. During this period the HOGGATT BAY put to sea several days for refresher carrier landings, intercept training, strafing and rocket firing practice, and anti-aircraft gunnery.

On July 26, orders were received to proceed to Adak, Aleutian Islands, via Ulithi and Eniwetok to join the 4th fleet. The operation for which the HOGGATT BAY was scheduled was cancelled due to the receipt of the Japanese surrender. The announcement of the Japanese surrender found the HOGGATT BAY in the center of the broadest expanse of water in the world, in the center of the vast Pacific Ocean, halfway between Wake Island and Adak, Alaska. This undoubtedly gave the ship the distinction of being one of the farthest ships from "no-where" in the Navy at the time of the world-resounding news. The acceptance of surrender and occupation of Northern Honshu and Hokkaido by Commander North Pacific Fleet was quickly substituted for the prospective invasion. The HOGGATT BAY, as carrier flagship, flew air cover for the naval force that entered Mutsu Wan and for the ceremony that was held in the Harbor of the Ominato Naval Base.

Planes from this vessel located several prisoner-of-war camps, while in the area, and participated in supply drops consisting of food, newspapers, magazines and medical supplies to the prisoners. They also had the pleasure of evacuating Lieut. Col. Devereux, Marine Defense Commander of Wake Island at the time of its capture by the Japanese. On September 14, Captain F. N. Kivette, U. S. Navy, relieved Captain Briggs of command.



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Upon departure of Commander North Pacific Fleet from Japanese waters, the HOGGATT BAY was reassigned to the Fifth Fleet in order to cover the EIGHTH Army landing at Aomori, on Northern Honshu. Upon completion of the occupation, the ship proceeded to Tokyo Bay immediately prior to its transfer to transport duty.

~~At present~~

HOGGATT BAY is now (September 1946)  
at Boston, Massachusetts, assigned to  
The Atlantic 16th Fleet (inactive).

REFERENCE SOURCES:

NAME AND DESIGNATION

USS HOGGART BAY (CVE 75)

PERIOD OF SERVICE

1944 -

SO NAMED

## STATISTICAL DATA

TYPE:

CLASS

BUILDER

LAUNCHED:

MAIN ARMAMENT

SPONSOR

LENGTH:

NAMED FOR:

BEAM:

ACQUIRED:

DRAFT:

1ST COMMISSIONED: 11 January 1944

DISPLACEMENT:

1ST COMMANDING OFFICER:

SPEED:

CHANGES IN STATUS

COMPLEMENT:

FINAL DISPOSITION

Originally MC 1112, chngd to AVG;  
to ACV on 20 Aug. 1942; to CVE on 15 July  
1943; in reserve, o/c, Boston, Mass.

Chg. to CVHE 75, 12 June 1955

Chg. to AKV-25 7 May 1959

## HISTORICAL INFORMATION

COMBAT OR OTHER OPERATIONS: